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The Right
STUMBLES
Until recently, Labor looked dead and buried all around 
the country. The conservative decade seemed at hand. The 
remarkable NSW election result in May, though, offered a 
glimmer of hope. ALR's team of commentators ponders
the result.
Managed 
Pain
For Rodney Cavalier, the NSW election result demonstrates the dramatic 
social changes of the last few decades. Labor, he argues, has to catch up or be 
caught out.
mmediately prior to the an­
nouncement of the NSW election in 
May, the conventional wisdom was a 
landslide win for the Greiner govern­
ment the Labor Party across Australia was said 
to be in such terrible odour that the NSW opposi­
tion under Bob Carr would be victims—innocent
or otherwise. For much of the term of the Greiner 
government, a conventional wisdom was the cer­
tainty of a first-term government gaining a vir­
tually automatic second term. When all of this 
went horribly awry under the unanswerable 
truth of the ballot box, not a commentator was 
prepared.
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Rather than analyse the root causes for the rejection of 
Greinerism, commentators took refuge in a new conven­
tion: the notion that there is a tide abroad against incum­
bents. Like the earlier postulates, it is balderdash. The first 
law of electoral politics was what counted: governments 
lose, oppositions do not win. With that in mind, a dissec­
tion of the fallacies of the now discredited wisdoms pro­
vide a fair degree of the explanation for the resurgence of 
New South Wales Labor.
Firstly, the dimensions of the Labor defeat in 1988 created 
a mindset in the Labor Opposition qualitatively different 
to their previous defeat in 1965. Truly routed, no one 
believed that Labor was a government in temporary exile. 
Labor saved itself an entire term by coming to grips with 
its defeat within days. Secondly, Labor did not have to sort 
out who was going to lead it. Once it was dear what seats 
the party had lost, there was only one possible leader and 
the Greiner government did not ever face an opposition 
beset with public divisions.
In 1988, Greiner was little more than a benefidary of a 
forfeit for which every member of the defeated govern­
ment, not just its leader, remains responsible. Having 
entered the Premier's office, Greiner did not ever enter the 
affections of the electorate. Rather, he preferred to believe 
that he was reinventing the culture of NSW politics.
Greiner undertook a sustained exercise in hubris when he 
hawked his victory in 1988 as a model for conservatives 
everywhere. At the heart of his rhetoric was the deification 
of management. At times it appeared that 'good' manage­
ment was taking the place of politics and government. In 
and of itself, however, management means nothing. An 
instrument of government is worthwhile only if it delivers 
goods and services to its consumers effiaently. What goods 
and services, delivered where, in what quantities—all 
these remain matters of politics and politidans.
When voters suffered pain as priorities altered to reflect 
new political imperatives, it did not matter one whit that
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the destruction of cherished services were textbook ex­
amples of paper-shuffling through chains of command. It 
did not matter that a raft of economists said that this was 
the 'correct' thing to be doing. What did matter was that 
the pain, being real, remained real. The substance was 
wrong, not the marketing. In the few weeks of the cam­
paign, Bob O u t  used his tongue to bring the memories of 
that pain to the forefront of voters' considerations. It was 
all very basic stuff, though ignored by the media, that 
sealed the return of pre-1988 Labor voters. Greiner gave 
former Labor voters reasons to drop his government, Carr 
provided them with reasons to return to the Labor fold.
Examined closely, the pain exacted was rather selective. 
Decisions announced to a chorus of approval by the leader 
writers and conservative columnists had a curious habit of 
altering on their way to the coalface. Notorious rorts in the 
provision of free transport for school children, for example, 
were as untouchable for the Coalition as they were for their 
Labor predecessors. User-pays was supposed to be a guid­
ing principle: it did not apply to water usage once the 
Greiner government assessed the impact on the voters of 
Increases in household water rates. Some decisions ap­
peared gimmick-driven: one year the government com­
pelled fee electricity distribution authorities to dissolve 
asset reserves so that fee government might send rebate 
cheques to consumers ana then, the following year, the 
authorities had to increase charges and enter heavy bor­
rowings.
For all of fee cutbacks of basic services—especially in 
country towns—the voters discovered that the vaunted 
reductions in outlays and debt did not translate into 
reduced taxes and charges. Quite fee contrary. Households 
had to find extra money in a time of recession for registra­
tion of motor vehicles, water rates, petrol, electricity, fares 
and licences. Voters were not impressed wife privatisation 
or corporatisation of and for itself. In fee railways, high- 
priced executives and consultants could only reduce 
operating expenditure by cutting staff and services—and 
then presented it as a novel departure in transport 
economics. (The same geniuses left out of their calculations 
the sodal utility of the railways—matters like the savings 
in motor vehicle third-party, fuel and fuel emissions, time 
lost in traffic jams, motor acddents, workers compensa­
tion.) Under Greinerism, a defidt is, by ideological disposi­
tion, a boo-word: investment in public works or the sodal 
welfare aspect of public utilities is noted solely for the 
outlay in fee current fiscal year, never fee potential returns 
in future years. When you are paying more for everything 
the government might still provide, it was somewhat dif­
ficult to discern exactly where the approval for the govern­
ment was feat the commentators liked to claim.
The actual performances of the new management was, on 
examination, not even adequate. In the education portfolio, 
for example, they attained a level of farce. On the first day 
of the Greiner government, fee Director-General designate 
of Education warranted dismissal without so much as an 
audience. TAFE came in for wholesale demolition: the 
government sacked that department's respected head and 
replaced him with a businessman who knew nothing of 
education or training. Talented people departed the ranks
of TAFE or kept a low profile. In desperation, fee govern­
ment had to turn to fee aforesaid director-general, the same 
man that they had sacked, to retrieve fee situation. The 
Ministry of Education, after vast expenditures on outside 
consultants, moved from a presumptive pre-eminence to 
imminent abolition. It was difficult to see much that was 
efficient in the management of these human resources.
Carr knew that resentment was there for the tapping and 
he tapped it. None of this was novel. The hollowness of the 
reporting of the election campaign was fee presumption 
that the Greiner message on management was either 
relevant or appropriate.
NSW had its closest contest in 15 years but fee media failed 
to report it. When an election campaign receives notices 
that it is 'boring' or 'uneventful', they are a signal solely of 
the inadequacy of the reporting tools at the disposal of the 
reporters. This refrain makes its appearance in any cam­
paign when there is an absence of pyrotechnics on the trails 
of the respective leaders; when voters are contemplative 
rather than demonstrative, preferring to keep their inten­
tions under wraps until they enter the polling booth; and 
when there is an absence of events or stunts that provide 
pictures or noise for cameras and microphones to point at. 
What was at play transcended single-purpose explana­
tions.
In fee 25 years since Labor lost office in 1965— government 
having changed twice since— the electoral landscape of 
NSW has transformed itself. It is the same story acroa 
Australia. In a system based on single-member electorates, 
shifts in individual wealth—even the perception of well­
being and status— can and will transform a suburb, a town, 
an electorate i n a remarkably short period of time. Fo r those 
lost in their own mythology, the problem for Labor in the 
Hawkc-Keating era has been the rejection of Labor by its 
'traditional base'. Those who peddle such nonsense do so 
because it is more palatable than the truth—the base has 
disappeared. It disappeared forever some time between 
1945 and the 1970s.
The notions of this base revolve around images of a 'labor 
Movement', stranded permanently in fee 19 th century, a 
reverie of industrial workers, their spouses and families 
marching as one with the branches of the Labor Party. For 
its adherents, theologians all, fee structure of fee Labor 
Party does not change, cannot change, must not change: 
The phantasm requires an ahistori cal understanding of the 
circumstances of the party's birth: the founders of the 
Labor Party deliberately created a party feat was based on 
Labor Leagues of the towns and suburbs, open to all Labor 
supporters, who would manage their own affairs through 
a self-governing federation of leagues. It was not until 
1916, in the midst of Conscription, that the present 
debauched structure came into effect. The most enduring 
feature of the Conscription tragedy for Australian Labor 
was the forfeiture of the control of fee party's destiny by 
the party membership.
In fee past 75 years, society has changed beyond recogni­
tion, and so has the structure of the workforce. In thii 
centenary year of Labor, nine out of ten voters ainnot-
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repeat cannot—belong to unions affiliated to the ALP. A 
majority of workers do not belong to unions; a majority of 
unionists cannot belong to ALP-affiliated unions; a 
majority of Labor voters are neither industrial workers nor 
unionists. Labor voters vote Labor not because of tradition. 
They certainly do not vote Labor because their union is 
affiliated to the ALP—a party with such an electoral base 
would be smaller than the Democrats.
Labor voters vote Labor because the Labor Party offers 
policies that appeal to their material self-interests or 
transcendent values (or both). Traditional' loyalties matter 
only for as long as Labor governments do not offend the 
perceptions of 'traditional' Labor voters and for as long as 
nothing has altered the perceptions of material cir­
cumstance or values of those voters. In 1991 Labor reversed 
its worst losses because the reality of Greinerism hurt 
former Labor voters most of all. Bob Carr has been busy 
saying thanks to those who came back; he knows how 
impermanent voter loyalties now are.
The Labor Party will survive into the next century only if 
its structure changes to match the changes in its policies 
and internal culture. Already, at branch level, the Labor 
Party has died in much of NSW. Contrary to simplistic 
notions of a widespread disillusionment with Hawke 
government policies, the attrition rate of new members of 
the party has been a constant down the postwar decades: 
about half of new members do not renew within three 
years, about 70 per cent within five years. New members 
leave because the ALP does not fulfil the hopes that they
had for it. In the 1980s new members failed to provide 
replacements for the non-renewals.
People join a party like the ALP, one that is in serious 
competition for state power, because they are wanting to 
have a say in the exercise of that power. The ailments of 
modem Labor do not come down to communication, that 
is a convenient pretence for those in power. The ailment is 
fundamental: the members of the ALP do not control their 
own party. At some point of time new members apprehend 
that unhappy truth and wonder why they are bothering.
Technology will not be a substitute for a declining mem­
bership—nor will party id entification on ballot papers, nor 
public funding. The processes of party decline will con­
tinue unless the ALP re-enters the affairs of the community. 
For that it will need a wholly different governance at the 
top. Across the world, notably in the former eastern bloc, 
the trend is toward empowerment of the individual. 
Labour parties will follow that trend by hand ing control to 
their own members or Labour parties will perish. For an 
increasing number of people who are interested in political 
action there are attractive alternatives to party member­
ship; for an increasing number interested in social change, 
politics does not provide the answer. Potential members of 
the ALP in the future are even less likely to long endure a 
party whose destiny is in outside hands.
RODNEY CAVALIER was a minister in the 1976-88 Labor 
government in NSW.
Reason and Imagination in 
Modern Culture
The early modern period fragmented 
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